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INTRODUCTION
A simple fact of life is that all people—taxpayers and evaders alike—
despise taxes and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). General
perceptions view the IRS as having “inherent advantages over taxpayers,”1
taking hard-earned money from and effectively irritating Americans each
April. Because the main objective of the IRS is to raise money for the
government, taxpayers perceive that the agency acts in a manner that calls
reasonableness into question.2 Although factually the IRS typically does
not engage in excessively unreasonable practices,3 taxpayers nonetheless
may feel victimized by the IRS’s rules. Organizations that associated
themselves with the Tea Party certainly felt victimized in 2013 when news
broke that IRS employees had been subjecting groups associated with
conservative political views to more rigorous standards than nonconservative organizations.4 What makes taxpayers feel even more
wronged—often raising attitudes toward the IRS from mere distaste to
raging hatred—is when one taxpayer is treated in an unequal, and
presumably unfavorable, manner than his next-door neighbor.5
A general duty of consistency is imposed on the IRS,6 but when courts
from state to state—and even courts within states—fail to adhere to the
same principles for similarly situated taxpayers, people get even angrier.
Such is the case with IRS revenue rulings, which are published by the IRS
Copyright 2017, by KRISTIN E. OGLESBY.
1. Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on
Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 723 (2004).
2. Id. at 725.
3. See TREAS. INSP. GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2015-2016 SEMIANN. REP. passim,
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/semiannual/semiannual_mar2016.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5P47-67D8].
4. See TREAS. INSP. GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE
CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW
(2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf
(last updated May 14, 2013) [https://perma.cc/E9ZT-RTG9]; IRS Finally Reveals
List of Tea Party Groups Targeted for Extra Scrutiny, WASH. TIMES (June 5,
2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/5/irs-reveals-list-of-teaparty-groups-targeted-for-/ [https://perma.cc/5ZR7-PM7S].
5. See generally Richard J. Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax
Fairness, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 421 (2006).
6. The IRS Mission is to provide United States’ taxpayers top quality service
by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law
with integrity and fairness to all taxpayers. IRM 1.1.1.2 (June 2, 2015); see also
I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2012); United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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and are said to carry the effect of law, though they often are disregarded
or applied inconsistently by courts.7 Perhaps if the IRS provided its
employees and United States’ taxpayers with more robust guidance in the
form of practical revenue rulings, there would not have been an
opportunity for the Tea Party targeting that occurred within the IRS
Exempt Organization Division.8
The Supreme Court of the United States has not issued a definitive
opinion on the deference that reviewing courts should accord revenue
rulings, but the Court has offered guidance as to how courts should interpret
and defer to administrative rulings generally.9 A circuit split exists regarding
the appropriate treatment of revenue rulings.10 Because revenue rulings are
not subject to the same level of scrutiny that Treasury regulations receive11
and because the IRS explicitly provides that revenue rulings do not carry
the same force that regulations are accorded,12 many scholars argue that
revenue rulings should be afforded some lesser standard of deference.13

7. See, e.g., Tedokon v. Comm’r., 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 657, at 4–5 (2002)
(finding revenue ruling “commanded deference”); Trinova Corp. and Subsidiaries
v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 68 (1997) (disagreeing with the Second and Ninth Circuits’
level of deference to revenue rulings), rev’d sub nom. Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 180 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing the Tax Court’s decision
and acknowledging a change in direction and that in light of recent Supreme Court
cases, revenue rulings should receive some degree of deference).
8. See Nicholas Confessore et al., Confusion and Staff Troubles Rife at I.R.S.
Office in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19
/us/politics/at-irs-unprepared-office-seemed-unclear-about-the-rules.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/8VX4-C9MN]. The IRS Exempt Organization department
administers tax law governing charities, private foundations, and other entities
exempt from federal income tax. See About Us, IRS, https://www.irs.gov
/charities-non-profits/about-irs-exempt-organizations (last visited Nov. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/T2M6-C2TV].
9. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1940); Chevron U.S.A.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001).
10. See discussion infra Part I.C.
11. See discussion infra Part I.
12. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1989) (“Revenue
Rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Treasury
Department Regulations . . . .”).
13. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS
Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 841, 857–69 (1992); Peter A. Lowy & Juan F.
Vasquez, Jr., How Revenue Rulings Are Made, and the Implications of That
Process For Judicial Deference, 101 J. TAX’N 230, 234 (2004) (stating that it is
abundantly clear that revenue rulings are not entitled to Chevron deference);
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Nonetheless, the regulations also provide that revenue rulings are
“published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases,
and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.”14 Controversy exists as
to whether the explicit disclaimer—codified in the Federal Treasury
regulations15—that revenue rulings do not rise to the level of Treasury
regulations necessarily strips revenue rulings of the force and effect of law.16
Nevertheless, applying any standard less than substantial deference to
revenue rulings conflicts with principles of administrative law and
contradicts established jurisprudence.17 Applying a lesser standard, such as
considering revenue rulings merely persuasive, effectively allows courts to
inject their own analyses into the meaning of the statute at issue, only
looking to agency interpretations to determine if the interpretations may
persuade a court otherwise.18
Part I of this Comment examines the legal principles behind revenue
rulings, discussing the two main standards of deference that may be
afforded to administrative rulings generally and assessing how various
courts have treated revenue rulings. Part II discusses applicability of the
standards of deference to IRS revenue rulings in light of the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp19 and the problems that have
arisen post-Mead. Particularly, this Part explores the standards behind
agency promulgations that have the force and effect of law. Part III
assesses revenue rulings and discusses the various reasons why the rulings
are entitled to substantial judicial deference. Part IV offers a solution to
alleviate the uncertainty of the deference afforded to revenue rulings,
focusing on revenue rulings in the context of charitable organizations. Part
V advocates a call for deference to revenue rulings as supported by the
examination in Part IV. This Comment concludes by arguing that revenue
Salem et al., supra note 1, at 744 (recommending that federal courts should give
revenue rulings Skidmore deference).
14. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d).
15. Id.
16. Compare Salem et al., supra note 1, at 744 (providing that revenue rulings
are not entitled to Chevron deference because they do not have the same force of
law as Regulations), with Ryan C. Morris, Substantially Deferring to Revenue
Rulings After Mead, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 999, 1040 (2005) (“A wide variety of
reasons suggest that revenue rulings are the type of administrative pronouncement
that deserves Chevron deference . . . .”).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
18. See Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Christensen,
Mead, and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 174 (2002); see
also Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54
ADMIN L. REV. 771, 772 (2002).
19. Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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rulings are entitled to Chevron deference as it is both plausible and logical
given the level of certainty taxpayers desire, the expertise of the IRS, the
method by which revenue rulings are generated, the penalties associated
with noncompliance, and the social policies particular to charitable
organizations.
I. REVENUE RULINGS AND STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
IRS revenue rulings are official interpretations of substantive tax law20
and are the “second most important” pronouncements made by the IRS.21
Defined as official interpretations by the IRS, revenue rulings are
published to inform and provide guidance to taxpayers, IRS officials, and
other parties concerned with principles of taxation.22 The issuance of
revenue rulings may offer interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code
(“IRC” or “Code”), Treasury regulations, and caselaw as applied to
hypothetical fact patterns.23 Formally, these promulgations represent the
IRS’s position on how the law applies to a particular set of facts.24 They
are formatted in a way that discusses hypothetical facts, applies the
appropriate law to the proposed facts, and sets forth the proper outcome
and reasons in support of such outcome.25
The IRS issues revenue rulings to promote correct and uniform
application of tax laws by its IRS employees and to assist taxpayers in
attaining maximum voluntary compliance.26 To those ends, the revenue
rulings inform IRS personnel of the internal revenue laws, related statutes,
treaties, regulations, and statements of procedures affecting the rights and
duties of taxpayers.27 The IRS instructs taxpayers to rely on revenue
rulings as guidance in applying the particular tax law to substantially
similar facts.28 In the event that taxpayers choose to ignore the principles
established in revenue rulings, they may face penalties associated with

20. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a), (v)(a); see also Rev. Proc. 89-14, §
3.01, 1989-1 C.B. 814.
21. Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor de Gezondheid v. United States, 129 F.3d
195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
22. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (1967).
23. See IRM 32.2.3.1 (Sept. 16, 2016) (discussing revenue rulings).
24. Rev. Proc. 2002-1, 2002-1 C.B. 1.
25. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir.
1998).
26. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1989).
27. Id.
28. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e).

636

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

noncompliance for “[n]egligence or disregard of rules or regulations.”29
As revenue rulings are effectively binding to the applications of similar
facts, they represent more than just pure guidance documents or policy
statements by the IRS; as statements of the IRS’s position on the law as
applied to similar facts, revenue rulings also provide standards governing
IRS taxation treatment unless and until the standard is altered by a
subsequent IRS promulgation.30
Revenue rulings and Treasury regulations are the principal means by
which taxpayers receive guidance in interpreting the IRC;31 nonetheless,
these means are far from comprehensive and still result in uncertainty
regarding IRC provisions.32 Revenue rulings differ, however, from
Treasury regulations, which are authorized by IRC § 7805, and many other
provisions of the IRC. Regulations are the most formal and authoritative
interpretations of the IRC.33 Regulations are issued by the Treasury
Department after extensive review within both the department and the
IRS34 and are among the highest authorities in administrative
pronouncements.35 The United States Supreme Court consistently has held
that courts must defer to regulations in general36 if the regulations are
“reasonable.”37 Regulations generally are afforded a force of law status.38
Conversely, revenue rulings do not have the force and effect of
regulations39 but “are published to provide precedents to be used in the
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2 (as amended in 2003).
30. Ehren K. Wade, Just What the Doctor Ordered?: Health Care Reform,
the IRS, and Negotiated Rulemaking, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 206 (2014).
31. Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance,
and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323,
324 (2008).
32. See discussion infra Part V.B.–C.
33. Korb, supra note 31, at 326.
34. See GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH: GUIDE TO
MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES 128–29 (7th ed. 2007).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
36. Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 447–50 (2003); United States
v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001); Cottage Sav. Ass’n
v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–61 (1991).
37. David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the
Post-Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 429 (1997) (stating that typically,
courts look at “long-standing interpretations that appear acceptable to Congress
and reliance on historical court precedents [as] legitimate means of establishing
the reasonableness of an interpretation”).
38. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S.
44, 51 (2011).
39. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1989).
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disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that
purpose.”40 Although the Supreme Court has provided explicitly that
Treasury regulations promulgated under notice-and-comment rulemaking41
carry the force and effect of law sufficient to meet what is required for the
highest level of deference,42 the Court has not denied such status to revenue
rulings.
A. Chevron: The Starting Point in Any Deference Discussion
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is where
any inquiry into the level of judicial deference accorded to administrative
promulgations in the modern era should begin.43 The issue before the
Supreme Court in Chevron concerned the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation of the definition of “stationary source”
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.44 Overturning the appellate
court’s decision and upholding the EPA’s interpretation, the Supreme
Court created a two-part test that became the standard for judicial review
of agency decision-making.45 This decision was based on the idea that
“[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left . . . by Congress”46 and creates a general

40. Id.
41. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency must publish
notice of its proposed rulemaking and afford interested persons the opportunity to
submit comments to make binding rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2012).
42. See Mayo, 562 U.S. at 51.
43. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44. Id. at 840.
45. Id. at 842–43. The Court provided that review of an agency’s promulgations
begins with the following analysis:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.
46. Id. at 843.
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stance of deference toward an administrative agency’s interpretation of the
statute entrusted to that particular agency—the agency’s enabling statute.47
Under a Chevron analysis, courts are instructed to undertake a twostep process: first, it must determine whether the agency’s own enabling
statute at issue is clear or ambiguous.48 If the statute is clear, the analysis
stops because no interpretation, and thus no deference, is necessary.49 If,
however, the statute is ambiguous, a court must defer to any reasonable
interpretations of the statute promulgated by the agency.50 If the
requirements for Chevron deference are not met, an agency promulgation is
not necessarily stripped of all deference because another standard of
deference exists.51
B. Skidmore: Skidding Away from Any Real Deference
Like Chevron, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. set forth a standard of
deference for administrative promulgations and required the Court to
consider the validity of an agency’s interpretation.52 Specifically, the
Court was tasked with defining “working time” for purposes of overtime
pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.53 Though Congress was silent,
the Court determined that the Department of Labor had the authority to
investigate practices regarding overtime pay, and, as such, the Department
could seek injunctions to restrain violations of the Act.54 Pursuant to this
grant of authority, the Department’s Wage and Hour Division issued an
interpretive bulletin that addressed “working time.”55 The Department of
Labor also filed an amicus curiae brief, outlining how it would apply the
standards for “working time” to the facts at bar.56 In line with historical
practice and policy, the Court found that the views of the Labor Division
were neither conclusive nor binding on courts.57 Instead, the bulletin was
found to be a result of the Division’s “official duty, based upon more
specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Morris, supra note 16, at 1040.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
Id. at 843.
See id.
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1940).
Id.
Id. at 135–36.
See id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
See id. at 139.
Id.
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likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”58 In terms of a Chevron
approach, the Skidmore Court essentially said that the document setting
forth the agency’s position being reviewed did not constitute an agency
policy choice and thus was not within the scope of Chevron.59 Rather, the
document was an agency interpretation of the policy choices made by
Congress in the statute.60 As such, courts were not required to defer to this
bulletin but could use it as guidance and accord any particular weight
deemed appropriate.61
Skidmore provided the following factors for courts to consider in
assessing the appropriate level of judicial deference toward agency views:
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”62 The
Skidmore standard is appropriate for more informal agency interpretations
and is a contingency standard for when Chevron fails.63 Because Congress
gave the courts express interpretive responsibility regarding the Fair Labor
Standards Act via statute, as opposed to the agency administrator, the
Skidmore Court created a standard by which certain agency rulings are
considered merely persuasive.64 This standard is much less deferential than
Chevron.65
C. Comparing Chevron and Skidmore
The rationale that underlies according agency pronouncements Skidmore
deference stems from the idea that agencies have specialized experience
compared to the courts as well as a greater opportunity to investigate and
obtain relevant information.66 This level of deference vests the reviewing
court with final arbitrating power on whether the agency’s interpretation

58. Id.
59. John F. Cloverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39,
54–55 (2003).
60. Id.
61. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
62. Id.
63. Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine,
119 YALE L. J. 2096, 2123 (2010).
64. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
65. See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
66. Morris, supra note 16, at 1025.
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is persuasive,67 leaving a wide opportunity for courts to disregard agency
interpretations completely if they so choose.68
Chevron rests on the presumption that Congress wanted agencies,
rather than courts, to act as the primary interpreters of their respective
statutory schemes.69 As such, under Chevron, agency interpretations are
entitled to deference as a matter of right.70 Courts are bound by mandatory
deference to the agency interpretation so long as the requisite two prongs
are met.71 Conversely, Skidmore involves a balancing of interests and vests
the judiciary with much more discretion regarding deferential treatment of
agency interpretations.72 If the reviewing court is satisfied that an agency
has demonstrated expertise and did not act in an unreasonable manner,
Skidmore allows—but does not require—courts to defer to the agency
interpretation.73
The test provided by Chevron and the presumption in favor of agency
interpretations as authoritative serve as an analytic barrier against active
judicial review of agency decisions unless such decisions are
unreasonable.74 Contrarily, under Skidmore, courts are free to adopt
whatever interpretation of statutes they so choose.75 Skidmore “makes clear
that the weight given to the agency interpretation is always ultimately up to
the court.”76 Whereas Chevron makes the interpretation binding on courts,
Skidmore effectively makes the agency “earn” judicial acknowledgement of
its position.77

67. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead:
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism In Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537,
1552 (2006).
68. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006) (discussing how
under Skidmore, the Court was following an agency’s rule only to the extent that
it is persuasive, and that in this particular case, the Attorney General’s opinion
was not persuasive and thus received no deference); Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146,
1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act).
69. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001).
70. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 856 (2001).
71. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
72. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 70, at 858–59.
73. See Hickman, supra note 67, at 1553.
74. Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical
Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States
v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 301 (2002).
75. Salem et al., supra note 1, at 755.
76. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 70, at 856.
77. Id.
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D. Historical Deference to Revenue Rulings
Although Skidmore and Chevron provide the two basic deferential
standards applied to administrative promulgations of law, the historical
deference accorded to revenue rulings by various courts has left the
deference status of revenue rulings muddled and uncertain.78 In particular
circumstances, revenue rulings are entitled to judicial deference, such as
when the revenue ruling reflects the contemporaneous and established
interpretation of a statutory provision79 or when the revenue ruling
represents the interpretation by the IRS of its own regulation.80 In other
cases, the decisions are in conflict.81
The United States Tax Court has held that it is not bound by revenue
rulings,82 viewing revenue rulings instead as mere opinions of the IRS—
with no effect of law—and claiming that revenue rulings are not binding
on the Commissioner or on the courts.83 But the Tax Court also has
admitted that taxpayers should be able to rely on revenue rulings.84
The majority of United States appellate courts hold the opinion that,
though revenue rulings are not tantamount to Treasury regulations, they
nevertheless are entitled to some level of deference, including “respectful

78. See, e.g., Amato v. W. Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1411 (2d Cir.
1985) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that revenue rulings were entitled
to great deference and carried “the force of legal precedents”); Carle Found. v.
United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1979) (giving rulings weight). But
see Knowlton v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 160, 165 (1985) (“While [revenue] rulings are
not binding upon us, . . . we are entitled to utilize such rulings as an aid to
interpretation.”), aff’d, 791 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1986).
79. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990); Jewett v.
Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (1982); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
80. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass’n. v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 563 (1990);
Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318; Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n. v. United States, 440 U.S.
472, 484 (1979).
81. See, e.g., Progressive Corp. v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 194 (6th Cir.
1992) (stating that revenue rulings “are entitled to great deference, and have been
said to ‘have the force of legal precedents’”). But see Stubbs, Overbeck &
Associates, Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146–47 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting
that a revenue ruling is “merely the opinion of a lawyer in the agency” and “is not
binding on the Secretary or the courts”).
82. Baker v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 143, 164 n.21 (2004), and cases cited therein.
83. See, e.g., Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 42, 45 (1996).
84. Baker, 122 T.C. at 164 n.21, and cases cited therein.
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consideration [and] some weight,”85 “great deference,”86 the “force of
legal precedent,”87 and “considerable weight.”88 Other circuits explicitly
left open the question of which standard of deference applies to revenue
rulings.89 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit once extended Chevron deference
to a revenue ruling,90 although it more recently has concluded that revenue
rulings may not necessarily be entitled to Chevron deference but should
carry “at least some added persuasive force.”91 The Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have held that a longstanding revenue ruling is entitled to
substantial deference as long as the interpretation of the statute is
reasonable,92 which is language mirroring the deference standard set forth
in Chevron.93
The United States Supreme Court also has spoken on the issue. The
Court initially applied Chevron to revenue rulings and noted that
interpretive rulings do not carry the same force and effect as Treasury
regulations.94 In Davis v. United States, the Court nonetheless held that
agency interpretations and practices must be given considerable weight
when they involve the contemporaneous construction of a statute and
reflect longstanding practices.95 Later cases—in which the Court noted
that the rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations—indicate a
shift in policy.96 In Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. v. United States, the
85. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998).
86. In re Kaplan, 104 F.3d 589, 599 (3d Cir. 1997).
87. Gillespie v. United States, 23 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
88. Wood v. Comm’r, 955 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1992).
89. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 431 F.3d 374, 379
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]lthough the parties discuss whether we should defer to
Revenue Ruling 79-404 pursuant to [Chevron or Skidmore], we need not resolve
that question.”); Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1335
(11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e need not determine the proper level of deference to be
given [to] Revenue Ruling 79-404.”).
90. Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 1993).
91. Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 534 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004).
92. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 788 F.3d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 2015); Sewards
v. Comm’r, 785 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 2015).
93. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”).
94. See Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990).
95. Id.
96. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 n.8 (1995); United States v.
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001).
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Court concluded that, although the revenue ruling was not entitled to
Chevron deference, “the Rulings simply reflect the agency’s longstanding
interpretation of its own regulations. Because that interpretation is
reasonable, it attracts substantial judicial deference.”97 More recent cases,
however, have avoided addressing the level of deference that should be
given but seem to leave open an opportunity for revenue rulings to be
entitled to Chevron deference by modifying the Chevron standard as
applied to all agency promulgations and setting forth alternative ways for
a promulgation to come within Chevron’s domain.98
II. CHRISTENSEN, MEAD, AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
Following Skidmore and Chevron, courts across the nation were
divided on the issue of whether, and to what extent, the judiciary should
defer to agency interpretations of law; views ranged from affording
substantial deference to giving no deference whatsoever.99 In the wake of
such confusion, the Supreme Court attempted to determine the proper
deferential standard treatment.
A. Christensen v. Harris County
Amid the circuit splits and lack of clarity regarding the scope of
Chevron application, Christensen v. Harris County100 was the Supreme
Court’s first attempt to recognize the issue of Chevron’s scope and offer
clarity.101 At issue was an advisory letter written by the United States
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (“Wage and Hour
Division”) in response to an inquiry by Harris County regarding a proposed
policy on compensatory time.102 The Court reasoned that Chevron
deference was not appropriate for the advisory opinion letter signed by an
acting administrator of the Wage and Hour Division because it was “an
interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for
example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.”103 The
Court held that “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like
97. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. at 220.
98. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
99. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Cleveland
Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200.
100. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 576.
101. See id.; see also Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 531 (2014).
102. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581.
103. Id. at 587.
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interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines”—inherently lacked the force of law and thus did
not warrant Chevron deference.104 Rather, interpretations that are designed
like opinion letters “are ‘entitled to respect’ under [the Court’s] decision
in [Skidmore], but only to the extent that those interpretations have the
‘power to persuade.’”105
The Court based its reasoning on the production process that generated
the letter and its lack of procedural protections.106 Christensen clarified
that not all agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference but
offered no guidance on how to determine which interpretations qualify.107
Thus, although Christensen noted the absence of particular factors—such
as formal adjudication, notice-and-comment procedures, and the force of
law108—will result in Skidmore deference rather than Chevron deference,
the Court failed to produce guidelines for determining which
promulgations are to be considered the force of law.
B. United States v. Mead Corp.
One year after Christensen, the Supreme Court again tackled the scope
of Chevron deference in United States v. Mead Corp.109 At issue was a
ruling letter by the United States Customs Service that changed the
classification of the Mead Corporation’s day planners under the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.110 The Tariff Act of
1930 and Treasury regulations direct the Customs Service to classify
merchandise and fix the rate and amount of duty applicable.111 Customs
Service completes this task by issuing ruling letters.112 In Mead, the
corporation challenged a Customs Service letter ruling that reclassified
day planners, thereby subjecting the corporation to a new tariff.113 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari “to consider the limits of Chevron
deference owed to administrative practice in applying a statute” and held

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 586; see also Womack, supra note 74, at 305.
See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 576, 587–88.
Id. at 587.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 222–25.
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 1500, 1502 (2012).
See id.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 224–25.
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that the ruling letter was not entitled to Chevron deference.114 The Court
reasoned that
[t]here are, nonetheless, ample reasons to deny Chevron deference
here. The authorization for classification rulings, and Customs’s
practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from
notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances
reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification
rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here.115
Under the agency’s own regulations, this type of ruling letter was limited
because it applied only to a small category of goods and was determined
on a case-by-case basis.116 The ruling letters were issued quickly and
without notice-and-comment, and any agency office could issue this type
of ruling without detailed reasoning for its decision.117 These ruling letters
rarely set out the rationale behind the classification decision in detail.118
In denying Chevron deference to this letter ruling, the Court decided
that although Congress had given the Customs Service authority to act
with the force of law, no congressional intent existed for according the
ruling letters such force.119 The ruling letter could not have the force of
law because the letter did not bind third parties and contained a warning
against assuming any right of detrimental reliance.120 The Court did not
elaborate on what was meant by the “force of law.”121 The Court
determined that the ruling letter was more akin to a policy statement,
agency manual, or enforcement guideline that was outside the scope of
Chevron deference.122 In reversing, the Court remanded the case back to
the lower court to be considered in light of the Skidmore standard.123
Per Mead, two conditions must be met to conclude that congressional
intent warrants a grant of Chevron deference. Mead instructs courts to
apply Chevron only when Congress has given the particular agency the
authority to bind parties with “the force of law” and when the agency
actually acted “in the exercise of that authority.”124 If one or both of these
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 233.
See id. at 223.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 238–39.
Id. at 226–27.
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requisite conditions are not met, then Skidmore is the appropriate level of
deference to be applied.125 The Mead opinion made clear that Skidmore is
the proper alternative when Chevron deference is not applicable.
Mead requires courts to look first at statutory circumstances to
determine whether congressional intent “to delegate general authority to
make rules with the force of law” exists.126 This congressional intent may
be evident through an express delegation of authority,127 an agency’s
general authority, and other statutory circumstances that evidence an
expectation of the agency to act with force of law when addressing
ambiguity in the statute or filling gaps in enacted law.128 Courts further are
instructed to assess whether Congress expressly authorized the agency to
engage in rulemaking or adjudication processes as a means for producing
the rulings or regulations for which deference is claimed.129 Explicit
congressional authorization for these processes is helpful in determining
if Congress has accorded an agency the ability to act with the force and
effect of law.130 Moreover, Mead noted that agencies engaging in noticeand-comment rulemaking fall under the umbrella of congressionally
intended force and effect of law status.131
If the requisites for Chevron deference are not met, Mead obliges
courts to consider the particular agency promulgation in light of
Skidmore.132 Courts are instructed to weigh “the thoroughness evident in
[the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”133 The majority opinion
in Mead suggests a sliding scale of deference. Failure to meet Chevron
vests the reviewing court with the power to determine what, if any,
deference should be given to the agency action at bar.134 Although
Skidmore provides factors that courts must consider, ultimately a court
reviewing an agency promulgation under Skidmore effectively considers
the promulgation as just another piece of paper for review on the judge’s
desk.135 Although a Skidmore result is troublesome, the same concern does
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 227.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 227.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 219.
See id. at 234.
See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 70, at 855.
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not arise for revenue rulings because the rulings meet the Mead
requirements for Chevron applicability and should be owed substantial
deference.
III. SUBSTANTIALLY DEFERRING TO REVENUE RULINGS: MEETING MEAD
When Mead was before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the court noted in its comparison of the Customs promulgations and IRS
publications that “[c]ustoms’ classifications rulings are in some ways an
even less formalized body of interpretations than IRS revenue rulings.”136
In Mead, the ruling letter, notably less formal than revenue rulings, was
accorded Skidmore deference.137 It follows that more formal revenue
rulings are entitled to a greater level of deference: Chevron deference. The
open-ended language of Mead leaves open the possibility of granting
Chevron deference to revenue rulings because the Court abandoned the
presumption that allowed courts to accept all reasonable agency action in
filling gaps or clarifying ambiguities in favor of agency interpretations that
have the force and effect of law.138 The legal qualities of revenue rulings
meeting the two prongs of Mead in addition to sound policy both support
such a finding of substantial deference.
A. Force and Effect of Law: The Congressional Grant
An act or promulgation with the force and effect of law binds those
who act, those acted upon, and the courts that review the agency’s
interpretation.139 As demonstrated in Mead, an agency whose action is
under review must be congressionally vested with authority to bind
regulated parties with the “force of law” to receive Chevron deference.140
This requisite legal force may be evidenced by notice-and-comment

136. Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
137. Mead, 533 U.S. at 238–39.
138. Cloverdale, supra note 59, at 53.
139. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 70, at 882. For an agency to be
eligible for Chevron deference, Congress must have given the agency power to
produce legally binding rules or adjudications:
[I]n determining whether Congress has delegated power to issue legally
binding rules or order, the key question is whether the statute provides
that a violation of the agency directive can result in the immediate
imposition of sanctions unless the rule or order is set aside on review or
stayed pending review.
Id.
140. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229.
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rulemaking or by formal adjudication.141 Although such evidence is
sufficient, neither notice-and-comment nor formal adjudication is
necessary for a finding of Chevron applicability; as such, revenue rulings
are not thrust immediately from the realm of Chevron deference for
lacking those procedural components.142
Mead clarified that the absence of notice-and-comment is not fatal to
a finding of Chevron deference.143 This idea was reiterated in Barnhart v.
Walton when the Supreme Court, in a discussion of Mead, noted that just
because an agency reached its interpretation through a method less formal
than notice-and-comment rulemaking, the interpretation should not be
deprived automatically of the judicial deference otherwise due.144 The
Court noted that Mead spoke to instances in which the Court has applied
Chevron deference to agency interpretations that did not arise from noticeand-comment rulemaking and that the level of deference accorded depends
largely on the interpretive method used for promulgating the action and
the nature of the question at issue.145
Although revenue rulings are not generated through formal noticeand-comment procedures, the issuance of revenue rulings is remarkably
centralized nonetheless and encompasses numerous levels of review
within the IRS.146 Contrary to the United States Customs Service ruling
letter at issue in Mead, only the IRS National Office issues revenue
rulings.147 The Associate Chief Counsel and Assistant Commissioner “are
responsible for the preparation and appropriate referral for publication of
revenue rulings reflecting interpretations of substantive tax law.”148
Ultimately, the “same level of the IRS and the Treasury Department” that
141. Id.
142. See id. at 231.
143. Id.
144. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002).
145. Id.
146. Revenue rulings are prepared by attorneys in the Office of the Chief
Counsel and approved by the Chief Counsel, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
and Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. They are signed by the Chief Counsel prior
to publication. See Chief Counsel Publications Handbook, IRM 32.2.2 (2017).
147. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (1967). The National Office functions to plan
and direct policies and programs with respect to legislation, regulations, interpretive
rulings and opinions, and advisory services pertaining to the laws administered by
the IRS. The work is handled by the Office of the Special Counsel to the National
Taxpayer Advocate and the Offices of the Associate Chief Counsel for a variety of
departments, including income tax and accounting, procedure and administration,
tax exempt and government entities, and general legal services. IRM 5.17.1.5
(2010).
148. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814.
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reviews Treasury regulations also writes and reviews revenue rulings.149
Because Congress, the Treasury, and all taxpayers adhere to the
understanding that Treasury regulations are legally binding on both the
government and taxpayers,150 it follows that revenue rulings, issued with
relatively the same purpose and in a similar manner, should be afforded
such status.
Although revenue rulings are legally binding, another concern that
arises in the context of a force and effect of law analysis is whether a
promulgation is legislative or interpretive in nature. In the past, scholars
and courts alike have scrutinized IRS promulgations, with a focus on
Treasury regulations, and debated whether such promulgations are
legislative or interpretive.151 This distinction was crucial in the past
because only legislative promulgations were considered for Chevron
deference.152 The division between legislative and interpretive rules and
regulations arose in Chevron in which the Court noted that the Chevron
doctrine represented the Court’s view of deference to legislative
regulations, implying that non-legislative, or interpretive, regulations were
entitled to the lesser Skidmore deference.153
Generally, legislative rules and regulations are promulgated pursuant
to a specific statutory congressional grant of authority;154 interpretive
rules, in contrast, are generated under a more general congressional grant
149. Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004).
150. See, e.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 168–69 (3d
Cir. 2008) (holding that reasonable final Treasury regulations promulgated under
I.R.C. § 7805 carry the force of law); Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435,
438 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that both temporary and final general authority
Treasury regulations are legally binding); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United
States, 142 F.3d 973, 979 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that all Treasury
regulations have the force of law).
151. See, e.g., Water Quality Ass’n Empls. Benefit Corp. v. United States, 795
F.2d 1303, 1305 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[L]egislative regulations therefore are accorded
greater deference than interpretive regulations.”); Kevin W. Saunders,
Interpretive Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and Proposal for Public
Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 346–47 (1986) (discussing the recognized
distinction between legislative and interpretive rules in administrative law).
152. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific
Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 516–24 (2011); Galler, supra note 13, at 862.
153. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Deference to Tax Administrative
Interpretation, 69 TAX LAW. 419, 422 (2016).
154. See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A
Reconsideration in Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other
Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 485–86 (2008).
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of authority,155 such as the authority to promulgate “all needful rules and
regulations” related to the internal revenue function.156 This distinction,
however, is no longer significant because the Supreme Court has dispelled
with it.157 Mead noted that Congress “may not have expressly delegated
authority or responsibility to implement a particular [statutory] provision
or fill a particular gap.”158 It still can be apparent from the agency’s
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that
Congress intended for the agency to speak with the force of law when
addressing ambiguities or filling gaps, even a statutory space or ambiguity
that Congress did not intend.159 In terms of force of law status, Mead failed
to mention the distinction between legislative and interpretive agency
acts.160 In the most recent Supreme Court case employing a Chevron
review in the tax realm, the Court did not analyze whether the statute was
legislative versus interpretive and only asked if the statute was ambiguous
such that the regulation came within the realm of Chevron.161 Thus, even
though many scholars argue revenue rulings are inherently interpretive 162
as opposed to legislative, the argument that only legislative rules are
within the scope of Chevron deference fails in light of Mead and Mayo.163
The contested interpretive versus legislative nature of revenue rulings 164
does not detract from their status as having the force and effect of law.
Congressional intent that the IRS revenue rulings carry force of law
also is evidenced by the words of the IRC. Revenue rulings are

155. See id.
156. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
157. See Cummings, Jr., supra note 153.
158. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
159. Id. at 231.
160. See id. at 218.
161. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S.
44 (2011). Paid medical students in the Mayo Foundation residency program
sought a refund of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act withholding from
wages, challenging the IRS interpretation of IRC § 3121, which classified the
medical residents as employees. The Court addressed the appropriate deferential
standard to be applied to an agency regulation interpreting an ambiguous or silent
statute and found Chevron as the appropriate standard of review because the
principles underlying Chevron applied in full force to the tax context.
162. See, e.g., Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17, 27 (1983) (stating that revenue
rulings have been called the “classic example” of interpretive rules).
163. See discussion infra Part III.B.
164. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 152, at 519 (“[A]n agency may not treat
nonlegislative rules as legally binding on a party”).
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promulgated under an express congressional grant of general authority.165
Congress has empowered the Secretary of the Treasury and the IRS with
the broad authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations” to
enforce the IRC, including all rules and regulations deemed necessary to
carry out the various functions of the IRS.166 Although this grant of
authority most often is cited for the legal effect of Treasury regulations,
revenue rulings also are promulgated pursuant to this general grant of
authority.167 Because Treasury regulations are explicitly within the realm
of Chevron deference,168 and revenue rulings are similar in weight,
generation, and penalty provisions—thus created with the force of law
status—revenue rulings accompany Treasury regulations within Chevron’s
domain.
B. Force and Effect of Law: Owning Your Power
The second inquiry under Mead instructs the reviewing court to look
at the specific agency action in question to determine if the agency is
acting with the force of law.169 IRC § 6662 imposes penalties on taxpayers
who underreport and underpay their taxes because of “negligence or
disregard of rules or regulations.”170 The rules and regulations associated
with penalties include revenue rulings or notices issued by the IRS. 171
Revenue rulings have the support of a congressional penalty, which
indicates that Congress intended them to carry the force and effect of
law.172 As a purely legal matter, taxpayers are subject to penalties for
failing to comply with guidance published by the IRS, including revenue
rulings; association with penal provisions sufficiently supports the

165. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations
as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal
revenue.”).
166. Id.
167. See Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937,
947 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
168. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292 (1988); Mayo
Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011)
(adopting the two-step Chevron analysis explicitly as the appropriate standard to
evaluate deference to Treasury regulations); Salem et al., supra note 1, at 737
(ABA recommending that Treasury regulations receive Chevron deference).
169. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
170. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(b)(2) (as amended in 2003).
172. See Morris, supra note 16, at 1041.
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proposition that revenue rulings carry the force and effect of law.173 Basic
logic surely associates penalties for non-compliance to derive only from
legally mandated rules. The authority of the IRS to subject a taxpayer to
penalties for noncompliance cannot be supported by any idea other than
that authority, and the rules and regulations enacted pursuant to it carry the
force and effect of law. In comparison, the EPA has authority to establish
thresholds for drinking water contaminants.174 Violations of these rules
may lead to penalties of up to $25,000 per day.175 Courts have applied
Chevron deference to these rules.176 According to Mayo, there is no
exceptionalism to be accorded to tax law; instead, consistency is required
between tax law and other areas of the law.177 Penalties leading to Chevron
deference in one area of administrative law necessarily means penalties
should be equated with Chevron deference in the tax arena.
Some scholars argue that penal provisions do not weigh in favor of
promulgations having the force of law.178 For example, if a taxpayer
refuses or fails to follow guidance published by the IRS, including revenue
rulings, the taxpayer is not subject to the penalty if the taxpayer’s position
“has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits,” regardless of
whether noncompliance is disclosed or the taxpayer intends to challenge
the validity of the respective IRS guidance;179 the lack of blanket penal
enforcement suggests that a taxpayer need not disclose on his tax return
that he chose to deviate from a revenue ruling. The disclosure requirement
for noncompliance with revenue rulings is notably different from the
requirements for Treasury regulations, in which positions adopted by
taxpayers that are inconsistent with regulations must be disclosed on tax
returns and the taxpayer must have a “reasonable basis” to avoid the
penalty.180 Noncompliance with a regulation also must represent “a good
faith challenge to the validity of the regulation.”181 Notwithstanding the
difference in penalties for disclosure of and nonconformity with regulations
173. Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 268 (2009).
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2012).
175. See id.
176. See City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
177. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S.
44, 53–56 (2011).
178. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining
Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking
Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1804–05 (2007).
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a) (as amended in 2003).
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) .
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) .
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versus revenue rulings, penalties for noncompliance with revenue rulings
still emerge from a statutory grant of authority. Considering these
mandatory and disciplinary provisions as separate and distinct from the
principles that carry the force and effect of law not only defies the law but
also defies basic logic.
IV. THE FUTURE OF REVENUE RULINGS AND THE APPROPRIATE
DEFERENCE STANDARD: EXAMINING CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
For regulations and revenue rulings alike, the IRS, through various
review mechanisms, acts with goals of consistency and coordination in
mind.182 Because of the countless duties of the IRS and the volume of
transactions and interactions between the IRS and taxpayers, “perfection
in the administration of such vast responsibilities cannot be expected.”183
Though no perfect solution exists to solve the problem of inconsistency in
a way that also guarantees a mechanism for absolute taxpayer certainty,
revenue rulings provide a vehicle for a near-perfect solution. Revenue
rulings often contain original and core standards by which the IRS
approaches taxation transactions, but if courts simply regard them as just
a piece of paper with no legal weight—a position that taxpayers eventually
will also take—the IRS is robbed of any incentive to issue revenue rulings.
An examination of how revenue rulings are used in tax, specifically in
the context of tax-exempt organizations, highlights the need for a
consistent deferential standard and supports a finding that Chevron
deference is appropriate. A cursory glance of § 501(c) of the IRC leaves
much to be desired for guidance on what exactly is required for an
organization to qualify as a tax-exempt entity.184 Outside guidance on
qualification for and upkeep of exempt status is absolutely necessary185
because over 1.5 million charitable organizations exist in the United
States,186 and the IRC provisions setting forth which entities qualify as tax
exempt cover a mere one page of the incredibly voluminous Code.187
Although the IRS has provided some substantive guides that elaborate on
182. Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law
Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 565 (2010).
183. Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 509 F.2d 1220, 1225 (2d Cir. 1975).
184. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012).
185. See Philip T. Hackney, Charitable Organization Oversight: Rules v.
Standards, 13 PITT. TAX REV. 83, 94 (2015).
186. Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATS.,
http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) [https:
//perma.cc/9QQR-N7SX].
187. See § 501(c)(3).
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the standards of § 501(c) in the regulations,188 the elaborative content
consists of broad restatements and leaves many unanswered questions.189
The IRS primarily has addressed these gaps in the Code with formal
guidance, including revenue rulings.190 The ensuing discussion analyzes a
sample of revenue rulings issued in the context of tax exempt
organizations and provides seminal standards by which the law of exempt
organizations is governed. The discussion concludes by discussing the
implications of failing to defer substantially to these core legal principles.
A. Hospitals
Revenue Ruling 69-545 examined whether two different nonprofit
hospitals qualified for an exemption from federal income tax under §
501(c)(3)191 of the IRC.192 The first hospital was exempt because it had an
emergency room open to everyone—in addition to providing care to all
people in the community who could pay, having an open medical staff,
and using surplus funds on expanding facilities, improving quality of care,
medical training, education, and research.193 Additionally, the hospital was
operated by a board of trustees composed of neutral community leaders.194
Conversely, the second hospital was not exempt from federal income tax
because it was not operated for the exclusive benefit of the public but,
rather significantly, operated for the private benefit of the previous

188. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1 (as amended in 2017); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.505(c)–1T (1986).
189. See Hackney, supra note 185, at 93–94.
190. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (examining charitable trust
law to determine that “charitable” means what is the “generally accepted legal
sense of that term” and establishing the community benefit rule for hospitals to
qualify as charitable organizations); Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115
(establishing rules for charitable qualifications for organizations that provide
housing); Rev. Rul. 67-151, 1967-1 C.B. 134 (establishing that organizations
formed for the purpose of preventing children from working in hazardous
conditions is charitable and thus tax exempt).
191. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are organizations, often charitable, that
are exempt from federal income taxes under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code. To qualify for tax-exempt status, an organization must operate exclusively
for one of the enumerated tax-exempt purposes, must be a non-profit organization,
may not engage in electioneering, and cannot have a substantial part of activities
be lobbying activities. See § 501(c)(3).
192. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 117–18.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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owners.195 Though the second hospital was owned by a nonprofit
organization at the time, the previous private owners still retained control
of the hospital through the board of trustees and committees, using that
control to limit several functions of the hospital and execute favorable
rental agreements with the hospital for office space.196
In deciding whether a particular hospital qualified for an exemption,
Revenue Ruling 69-545 established the “community benefit standard,”
which hospitals must meet in order to attain tax-exempt status as a
charitable organization.197 Prior to this Revenue Ruling, to obtain
exemption a hospital needed to “be operated to the extent of its financial
ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered and not
exclusively for those who are able and expected to pay.”198
Rather than simply standing for the proposition that a functioning
emergency room satisfies the requirements of § 501(c)(3), this Ruling
stands for the idea that “charitable” is defined broadly in terms of
community benefit and holds that promoting health constitutes a
“charitable purpose” under § 501(c)(3).199 This widely accepted standard,
which still exists today as one test required for nonprofit hospitals to
achieve tax-exempt status, represents the idea that revenue rulings, as a
whole, signify much more than just substantive law applied to very
particular facts. Rather, revenue rulings convey sound legal reasoning and
mandates that, as evident from the longevity of this specific test, have the
force and effect of law.200 For example, the express language of Revenue
Ruling 69-545 states that “Revenue Ruling 56-185 is hereby modified to
remove therefrom the requirements relating to caring for patients without
charge or at rates below cost.”201 If Revenue Ruling 56-185 applied only
to the specific factual scenario and substantially similar circumstances,
modification of that specific standard would have been unnecessary.
Instead, presumably recognizing the wide breadth of the standards that
revenue rulings have, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 69-545 by both
building from and revising the principles of Revenue Ruling 56-185.
Revenue Ruling 89-157 revised the community benefit standard when
the IRS determined that operating an emergency room open to the public
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203 (modifying Rev. Rule. 69-545,
1969-2 C.B. 117).
199. See E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1280–81 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
200. See discussion supra Part III.
201. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 120.
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was not required to meet the community benefit test, so long as other
substantial factors existed signifying that the hospital operated for the
public benefit.202 This Ruling also stated that specialty hospitals, which are
not expected to operate emergency rooms due to the nature of the
specialized practice, also can qualify for the § 501(c)(3) exemption if
similar substantial factors showing that the hospital operates exclusively
for the benefit of the community are present.203 Reading Revenue Ruling
89-157 in conjunction with Revenue Ruling 69-545, it becomes clear that
a nonprofit hospital must make its services available to the entire
community and provide additional community or public benefits to qualify
for § 501(c)(3) exemption status.204
Not only is the progress of the IRS standard for exempt hospitals
shown through the evolution of the discussed revenue rulings, these
rulings also provide for flexibility and change.205 Read together, these
revenue rulings indicate that no single factor controls in determining
exemption status and that all facts and circumstances must be weighed.206
The IRS repeatedly has chosen to promulgate the particular hospital
exemption requirements through revenue rulings; that historical pattern of
decisions should not be discounted by a low standard of judicial
deference.207 In fact, these rulings, which provide the governing standard
for exemption status, have withstood numerous attempts by various
legislators to modify or change the community benefit standard.208 Molding
standards of charitable purposes into rigid legislative rules is difficult and
often illogical because unbending standards do not take into account the
flexibility and factual considerations required.209 Because the rulings
establishing and elaborating on the community benefit standard are
reasonable interpretations of IRC § 501(c)(3) standards for maintaining
202. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
203. Id.
204. See IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003).
205. See Bobby A. Courtney, Hospital Tax-Exemption and the Community
Benefit Standard: Considerations for Future Policymaking, 8 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 365, 368–71 (2011).
206. Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and NotFor-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption
Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (1995).
207. See Courtney, supra note 205, at 393.
208. Proposed, but not passed, legislation has attempted to modify or abandon
the current community benefit standard. See, e.g., H.R. 790, 102d Cong. (1991)
(introduced by Representative Edward R. Roybal to move toward relief of poverty
or charity standard); H.R. 1374, 102d Cong. (1991) (introduced by Representative
Brian J. Donnelly to move toward relief of poverty or charity standard).
209. See Hackney, supra note 185, at 115–16.
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exempt status, courts should be bound to defer to the community benefit
standard. For example, failure to accord the community benefit standard
Chevron deference would call into question the exemption status of many
hospitals and open the door for discrimination across the courts.210
B. Unrelated Business Income and the Notion of “Relatedness”
Another area of the law in which tax-exempt organizations rely on the
promulgation of revenue rulings as a basis for certain criteria is unrelated
business income.211 Section 511 of the IRC states that taxes are imposed
on the unrelated business income of tax-exempt organizations.212 The
purpose of taxing income that is unrelated to the organization’s exempt
purpose is to equalize exempt organizations and their non-exempt
competitors.213 Although the Code provides that income subject to taxation
is income from a trade or business not substantially related to the
organization’s performance of its charitable purpose or function,214 the
Code also leaves much to be desired for specific organizations that must
determine whether certain arms of their businesses trigger income tax or
are protected by the § 503(c) exemption.215 Because the IRC is not the
proper forum to evaluate various entities and whether a new arm of
business is sufficiently related to the exemption-related purpose, the IRS
uses revenue rulings to promulgate guidance.216 One such promulgation,
Revenue Ruling 73-104, provided that an art museum’s sale of greeting
cards that reproduced artwork on display in these museums was exempt
from income tax as an unrelated trade or business under § 513 because it
contributed importantly to the accomplishment of the museum’s
purpose.217 Although the cards were sold at a profit and in competition
with other greeting card publishers, the sale of the cards still was related
to the museum’s exempt purpose.218

210. See Confessore et al., supra note 8.
211. See generally Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating
“Enterprise”: The Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41
AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 109 (2003).
212. See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (2012).
213. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 36 (1950); S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 28 (1950).
214. I.R.C. § 513.
215. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (1983) (providing minimal guidance on what
it means to have an unrelated trade or business).
216. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (1967).
217. Rev. Rul. 73-104, 1973-1 C.B. 263.
218. Id.
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The next revenue ruling issued, Revenue Ruling 73-105, further
provided that an American folk art museum selling reproductions of art
and books in the associated gift shop would not be subject to income tax
from an unrelated trade or business because these items contributed to
accomplishing the museum’s exempt purpose—existing as an educational
art museum on the basis of ownership, maintenance, and exhibition for
public viewing of an art collection.219 The IRS, however, reached a
different result for scientific books and city-based souvenirs sold in the gift
shop: these items had no causal relationship with—and did not contribute
to—the museum’s exempt educational purpose, so the sale constituted
taxable unrelated trade or business income under § 513 of the Code.220
These rulings underscore the importance of carefully considering the
extent to which the characteristics of items sold by a charitable organization
furthers the organization’s exempt purpose to determine if taxable unrelated
business income has been generated or if the income is exempt under §
513.221
C. Political Campaign Activity
A third area of charitable organization tax law in dire need of clarity
and deference involves § 501(c)(3) organizations and their involvement in
political campaign activity.222 In order for a § 501(c)(3) organization to
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Stuart J. Lark, Revenue From Product Sales By Religious
Organizations May Be Taxable, 13 J. TAX’N EX. ORG. 94 (2001).
222. See, e.g., Bright Lines Project, Comment Letter on Political Activity
Guidance for Section 501(c)(3) Organizations (May 16, 2016), http://www.citizen
.org/documents/Final%20BLP%20(c)(3)%20Letter--Signed.pdf [https://perma.cc
/R4XB-F3AE]; Bright Lines Project, Comment Letter on Proposed Guidance for
Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political
Activities (June 16, 2015), http://www.brightlinesproject.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/06/Comment-re-501c3s.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWM8-HP4E]; Bright Lines
Project, Comment Letter on Proposed Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare
Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bright%20Lines%20Project%20Comment%2
0FINAL%20with%20exhibit.pdf [https://perma.cc/ME92-DWK6]; Am. Bar
Ass’n, Section of Taxation, Comment Letter on Comments on 501(c)(4) Exempt
Organizations (May 7, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/taxation/policy/050714comments.authcheckdam.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/ZRY8-SK3U]; Alliance for Justice, Comment Letter on Guidance for TaxExempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities
(Feb. 27, 2014), https://bolderadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/AFJ

2017]

COMMENT

659

enjoy income tax exemption under § 501(a), the organization may not
participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office.223 Although the plain
language of § 501(c)(3) purports to bar involvement in political campaign
activities, this interpretation has been negated by essential caselaw and
revenue rulings.224
Complying with each requirement for tax-exempt status is paramount
for § 501(c)(3) organizations because without such obedience, these
organizations may face penalties225 and/or lose their § 501(c)(3)
organization status altogether, thus subjecting themselves to income taxes
on revenues.226 As such, organizations want and need robust and brightline rules on how to avoid prohibited political campaign activities.
Following the 2004 election year, § 501(c)(3) organizations had many
questions regarding election year activities and the prohibition on political
campaign involvement.227 In an effort to help these organizations stay in
compliance with federal tax law, the IRS issued Fact Sheet 2006-17 to
enhance education and enforcement efforts while the agency drafted a
more comprehensive and authoritative source of guidance.228 This “living”
document—the predecessor to Revenue Ruling 2007-41—was issued with
a request and encouragement for comments from the public, which would
then be, and in fact were, taken into consideration for future IRS
developments and feedback.229
In the midst of a bare statute and minimal regulations on point,
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 was issued to provide guidance on the scope of
the tax law prohibition of political campaign activities by § 501(c)(3) taxexempt organizations.230 In an effort to delineate allowable and
unallowable activities related to political campaign activities, Revenue
Ruling 2007-41 set forth 21 scenarios with examples and explanations of
whether the specific activity constituted participation or intervention in a

_comments_NPRM_Guidance_for_Tax-Exempt_Social_Welfare_Organizations
_on_Candidate-Related_Political_Activities.pdf [https://perma.cc/S97E-RB2T].
223. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
224. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431–
32 (8th Cir. 1967); Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1
C.B. 1427.
225. I.R.C. § 4955.
226. See § 501(a).
227. See I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-17 (Feb. 2006).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1492.
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political campaign.231 Revenue Ruling 2007-41, however, also provides
that the final determination of whether a § 501(c)(3) organization runs
afoul to the political campaign prohibition “depends on all of the facts and
circumstances of each case.”232 Furthermore, unlike other areas of tax law,
the campaign intervention prohibition—and Revenue Ruling 2007-41
specifically—has been subject to very few judicial decisions.233 As such,
the meaning of factors addressed in Revenue Ruling 2007-41 is uncertain,
and exempt organizations are forced to be excessively risk-averse and to
avoid “even the most benign nonpartisan efforts altogether.”234
Section 501(c)(3) organizations—the most numerous category of taxexempt organizations in the United States235—have pushed repeatedly for
more guidance on how to comply with the political campaign prohibition.236
Because of the large number of organizations subject to this prohibition and
the lack of clarity on it, the IRS should develop guiding rules237 to improve
compliance and provide for more predictable outcomes.238 Advocates for
comprehensive rules regarding the full range of potential activities that will
or will not violate the campaign intervention prohibition realistically
acknowledge that adopting Treasury regulations is not possible.239 Rather,
these advocates repeatedly have proposed a solution in the form of revenue
rulings.240 Furthermore, Revenue Ruling 2007-41 demonstrates that
creating a set of rules regarding the campaign intervention prohibition is
not an unattainable task; the IRS can and has given a “manageable set of
categories in which political campaign intervention is most likely to
arise.”241 Once these organizations become more informed under
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want to Develop Rules Regarding
Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 655 (2012).
234. Comment Letter on Political Activity Guidance for Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations, supra note 222.
235. Quick Facts About Nonprofits, supra note 186.
236. See supra notes 222–228 and accompanying text.
237. Aprill, supra note 233, at 665.
238. Comment Letter on Political Activity Guidance for Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations, supra note 222.
239. Id.
240. Id.; see also Proposed Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare
Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, supra note 222;
Proposed Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on CandidateRelated Political Activities, supra note 222; American Bar Association, supra
note 222; Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on CandidateRelated Political Activities, supra note 222.
241. Aprill, supra note 233, at 680.
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promulgated rules, scholars predict that behavior will fall more in line with
legal norms,242 which unquestionably is a goal of the IRS.243
Although IRS promulgations regarding the campaign intervention
prohibition are desperately needed, the IRS is unlikely to devote time and
resources to producing guidance if it will not be respected as binding
law.244 Although revenue rulings are undeniably the solution to elaborating
on Revenue Rule 2007-41 and filling gaps in the prohibition, no reason
exists for the IRS to produce such if courts fail to defer to the promulgations.
Granting Chevron deference to these hypothetical revenue rulings—and all
revenue rulings—promotes the promulgation of “administrative directives
in a way that best effects compliance.”245 If the judiciary substantially
defers to the hypothetical revenue rulings, it signals to the public that the
rulings represent the applicable law and that § 501(c)(3) organizations can
rely on the rulings without risking losing their exemption status.
D. Complexity of Charitable Organizations Tax Law as a Whole
The IRS develops guidance items, including specific revenue rulings,
“in large part based on its agents’ interactions with charitable organizations
in adjudications.”246 There obviously is a standard that must be applied in
determining whether an entity is tax exempt as a charitable organization,
but the requisite standard is not necessarily one that can be encompassed
in a rigid, statutory rule.247 The idea and nature of “charity” is a fluid
concept, changing over time with society and thus should exist in a manner

242. Louis Kaplow, Rules v. Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 575 (1992).
243. See generally Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1989).
244. Revenue rulings have the benefit of being promulgated frequently and
expeditiously without the burden of notice-and-comment procedures. If, however,
revenue rulings lack judicial deference, applicability to similar circumstances falls
and the IRS lacks incentive to issue blanket guidance. Instead, the IRS may retreat
to only issuing a Private Letter Ruling (“PLR”), which is a statement issued to a
taxpayer interpreting and applying tax law to the taxpayers set of facts. A PLR is
binding only on the particular taxpayer who requested it, and PLRs are issued at
the expense of each individual taxpayer looking for guidance. Understanding IRS
Guidance, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-abrief-primer (last updated July 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5B GC-E7HK]. For
exempt organizations, each PLR is typically issued at a fee of $28,300. See Rev.
Proc. 2017-1, I.R.B. 2017-1.
245. Aprill, supra note 233, at 676.
246. Hackney, supra note 185, at 94.
247. Id. at 115–16.
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easily modified248—a concept recognized by the Supreme Court.249 In
1913, when the income tax was created, racial discrimination was
commonly accepted among society and Congress.250 Noting the flexible
and changing nature of the charitable standard, the Court in 1983 held that
such discrimination was contrary to public policy; thus, an otherwise taxexempt organization could be denied exempt status because of racially
discriminatory policies.251 The Court’s decision in Bob Jones University
v. United States is one of many illustrations of the evolving perception of
charitable purposes in the eyes of society.252 Because of the evolving
connotation of “charity,” the applicable rules and regulations for charitable
organizations must be open to flexibility and progression as society grows.
As seen above in the context of health care and exemption status,
unrelated business income, and political campaign activity, the
considerations that must be weighed in evaluating an organization’s status
as a § 501(c)(3) entity do not necessarily lend themselves to a rigid rule
appropriate for statutory codification. The ability of revenue rulings to take
the general position of the IRS and mold a concept around particular facts
and circumstances, such as location-based souvenirs versus museumcontent souvenirs, not only conveys the position of the IRS clearly in
regard to a question of tax law but also illustrates the correct way to apply
this concept. If revenue rulings are to be disregarded—or considered
merely persuasive—taxpayer reliance on them may be eroded, and
eventually, the IRC will become lengthier and more complex, with
specific provisions like the precise designation of each individual souvenir
that can be sold in a tax-exempt museum and whether the corresponding
income would be excluded.253 Because the IRS is vested with the authority
to produce fact-sensitive opinions affecting many taxpayers in a quicker
manner and with a broader sweep than courts, these rulings should be
entitled to substantial judicial deference.
It became evident from the resulting Tea Party scandal254 that the IRS
was looking for ways to streamline some of the various processes the IRS
must engage in with very little guidance.255 Perhaps if IRS agents had
248. See id.
249. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 605.
252. Hackney, supra note 185, at 121.
253. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
254. See TREAS. INSP. GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 4.
255. See Confessore et al., supra note 8 (Former Director of the IRS Exempt
Organizations Division saying that the Tea Party targeting may have resulted from
specialists trying to develop a single, long survey that could be sent to many kinds
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informal guidance like revenue rulings to rely on, much of the
discrimination toward Tea Party organizations could have been avoided as
there would have been no need for the already overworked exemption
division256 to craft its own personal methods for evaluating potentially taxexempt organizations. Statutory provisions, due to the costs and
difficulties associated with promulgation, are not necessarily appropriate
for establishing the standards by which charitable rules are governed.257
Rather, “[c]haritable tax law should instead promote a range of diverse
ideas.”258 Having a statutory, rule-oriented regime precludes the
promotion of ideas before they can even arise.259 The taxation laws
covering tax-exempt organizations demonstrate that revenue rulings are
more suitable to address the constant fluctuation that the tax realm
endures.260
V. A CALL FOR DEFERENCE
Though confusion among the circuit courts regarding the proper
standard of review for IRS guidance documents exists, logic and
experience dictate that revenue rulings should be entitled to Chevron
deference.261 Guiding principles of expertise, agency purpose, administrative
feasibility, certainty, and consistency support this conclusion. Applying
Chevron deference to revenue rulings is not foreign to the courts. For
example, in Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc., a special concurrence
concluded that IRS revenue procedures are entitled to Chevron deference.262
Additionally, in Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc., the court stated, “[W]e conclude
that the underlying rationale of Revenue Ruling 82-20 is valid, ‘reflect[s]

of groups and thus make the status decision process less burdensome on the
agency).
256. Id.
257. Hackney, supra note 185, at 119.
258. Id. at 120.
259. Id.
260. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
261. See Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 528 F.3d 703, 711 (9th Cir. 2008)
(avoiding the Chevron question by holding that the revenue ruling at issue was in
line with the plain meaning of the statute but would be worthy of deference under
either Chevron or Skidmore even if the statute was unclear).
262. Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937,
945–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
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the agency’s longstanding interpretation of its own regulations,’ and thus
deserves ‘substantial judicial deference.’”263
A. The IRS as the Tax Expert
Agency expertise provides support for substantial deference to
revenue rulings.264 Under the IRC, the IRS has been tasked with not only
revenue collection but also non-revenue raising functions associated with
home ownership, health care, education, work incentives, and reduction of
poverty.265 Thus, Congress has recognized that the IRS is a necessary arm
of the government and is at least somewhat successful in the associated
field of expertise.266 Stripping IRS revenue rulings of deference is
irrational because tax law is exceedingly specialized, with a vast body of
law and guidance; the subject matter specialization of the IRS should be
more unescapable to reviewing courts than less specialized areas of law.267
Furthermore, unlike appointed federal judges, Treasury officials are
democratically accountable, better situated to be receptive of taxpayer
behavior and changes in policy, and possess significantly more expertise
in the convoluted area of tax law.268 In 2015, federal district courts across
the nation were flooded with the filing of more than 300,000 new
lawsuits.269 Federal judges already are overworked, and litigants are stuck
waiting years before their particular matters reach judicial resolution.270 It
is impractical and a waste of judicial resources for a court to interpret law
263. Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 182 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220
(2001)).
264. See generally Levy & Glicksman, supra note 152, at 558.
265. Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and
Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 531 (2012).
266. See Alan Cole, The IRS Has Too Many Responsibilities, TAX POLICY BLOG,
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/irs-has-too-many-responsibilities (last visited Nov.
16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F4N4-4R9M].
267. Kristin E. Hickman, The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the Good Tax:
Tax’s Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 VA. TAX REV. 553, 589 (2016).
268. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism In Judicial
Deference, supra note 67, at 154.
269. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2015, US COURTS, http://www.us
courts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2015 (last visited
Sept. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/U79T-KK9Z].
270. Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked And
Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b (last updated Oct.
1, 2015) [https://perma.cc/DM5M-VXWH].
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that subject matter experts, the IRS, already have addressed. Revenue
rulings are generated with a great deal of care and precision,271 and
substantially deferring to them is practical for the judiciary and complies
with principles of administrative law as a whole.272 Chevron is intended to
detach the courts from the substantive act of agency lawmaking if the
agency stays within legislatively defined parameters,273 and as such,
revenue rulings deserve substantial judicial deference.
A counterargument to the call for revenue ruling deference based on
the expertise of IRS officials compared to federal judges arises where the
jurisdiction of tax courts begins.274 A query exists as to why—in this
specialized court for this specific area of the law—the judges are not
accorded a presumption of both procedural and subject matter expertise.
Furthermore, scholars who oppose giving Chevron deference to revenue
rulings take this position because of a disfavor of tax exceptionalism.275
But carving out an exception for tax law compared to other administrative
agencies is exactly what the Supreme Court denounced in Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States.276
Holding that challenges to the validity of Treasury regulations generally
are governed by Chevron to the same extent as any other promulgation
issued by another administrative agency, Mayo clarified that tax law is
integrated into the broad sphere of administrative law.277 As such, the
existence of the specialized Tax Court has no bearing on the judicial
standard of deference accorded to any agency act, whether a particular act
comes before the Tax Court or any other federal court. Furthermore, this
Comment does not advocate for Chevron deference solely for IRS revenue

271. See discussion supra Part III.A.
272. See discussion supra Part I.A.
273. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465,
521 (2013).
274. The United States Tax Court is a court of nationwide jurisdiction
physically located in Washington, D.C. The judges travel nationwide to conduct
trials in designated cities. Each of the 19 Tax Court judges are appointed by the
President and have special expertise in federal tax laws as compared to federal
district court judges who have jurisdiction over nearly all categories of federal
cases. See About the Court, U.S. TAX COURT, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov
/about.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7K25-MSNX].
275. See generally Levy & Glicksman, supra note 152, at 500 (“[T]o the extent
that agency-specific precedents deviate from standard administrative law
doctrine, they challenge the very foundations of administrative law.”).
276. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
51 (2011).
277. Id. at 52–54.
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rulings but supports substantial deference to all agency interpretations that
meet the requirements of Chevron and Mead.278
B. The Need for Quick Answers
The issue of democracy and lack of notice-and-comment procedures
may cause many taxpayers to question whether Chevron deference is
appropriate for revenue rulings. Though revenue rulings typically are not
generated through public notice-and-comment procedures—a process that
the Supreme Court has explicitly stated is not required for Chevron
deference279—there remains an opportunity for public participation in the
process of creating revenue rulings.280 Public “outcry,” or the need for
guidance in a complex or confusing situation, is why revenue rulings exist
and how the creation of one is sparked.281 The revenue ruling program
emerged in 1953 as a solution to controversy over the reluctance of the
IRS to make letter rulings publically available after issuance to individual
taxpayers.282 Additionally, the IRS occasionally requests comments from
the public on proposed revenue rulings.283 Furthermore, Congress is
notorious for taking lengthy amounts of time to pass legislation,284 and

278. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.
279. Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
280. See, e.g., I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-17, supra note 227 (requesting for
public comment on the IRS position regarding compliance with political
campaign activity restrictions); I.R.S. Notice 2009-64, 2009-36 I.R.B. 307
(proposing a ruling that would hold tangible assets used in converting corn to fuel
grade ethanol are property included in a specific asset class for depreciation);
I.R.S. Notice 2002-31, 2002-1 C.B. 908 (outlining the contents of a proposed
ruling regarding the employment taxation and reporting of nonqualified stock
options and nonqualified deferred compensation transferred to a former spouse
incident to divorce).
281. The revenue ruling program grew out of the IRS’s reluctance to make
letter rulings publicly available to everyone. There was initial controversy as to
whether the IRS should be required to publish all rulings issued to individual
taxpayers. Eventually, the IRS determined it would publish all letter rulings that
established new precedents, and eventually the Internal Revenue Code was
amended to mandate the public release of all letter rulings. Korb, supra note 31,
at 333–34.
282. Id. at 333.
283. See, e.g., I.R.S. Announcement 95-25, 1995-14 I.R.B. 11 (requesting
comments on a proposed revenue ruling).
284. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 145.4051-1 (as amended in 2000) (temporary
Treasury regulation issued in response to a 1982 legislative act was only to remain
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according deference to administrative positions—if and when Congress
finds those positions to contradict legislative intent—may encourage
Congress to draft better laws that provide more clarity and certainty.285
C. Revenue Rulings Actually Save Taxpayer Dollars
Moreover, administrative feasibility and costs associated with
promulgating more formal statutes or regulations support increased
deference to revenue rulings, along with encouraging their creation. It is
neither feasible nor realistic to expect Congress to legislate, much less
anticipate, every possible issue and detail that might arise, thus triggering the
need for additional clarification via statutory guidance.286 The IRS issues
revenue rulings under various levels of review and authority287 prescribed by
the Internal Revenue Manual.288 Revenue rulings also are generated in a more
economical and sensible manner by not engaging in notice-and-comment
procedures.289 The notice-and-comment process consumes an enormous
in effect until final regulations were adopted but is still in the Code as a temporary
regulation today).
285. See Galler, supra note 13, at 882.
286. Daniel W. Graves, Not So Special after All: How Mayo Granted the
Treasury Unfettered Rule-Making Discretion, 77 MO. L. REV. 283, 283 (2012).
287. See IRM 39.5.4.3 (Mar. 2000) (according to the Manual, the relevant
Branch Chief reviews the revenue ruling and then forwards it to the Assistant
Chief Counsel, who then forwards it to the Assistant Commissioner with a
publication recommendation); see also Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2) (as amended
in 1989).
288. Susan C. Allen, Why the Internal Revenue Manual Is Valuable to Your
Clients, TAX ADVISER (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2015
/apr/tpp-apr2015-02.html [https://perma.cc/4746-ECM7]. IRS employees operate
under the Internal Revenue Manual:
The Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) is essentially the IRS employee
handbook. It contains instructions on how to carry out all administrative
and procedural matters, such as how to audit specific tax returns, collect
taxes, process returns, or assess penalties. The IRM may be the most
important tool provided to IRS employees as it contains vital information
to help them do their jobs.
Id.
289. Although notice-and-comment does permit some public input, it does not
require full transparency. Agencies are not required to publish every alteration to
a rule for public comment unless it is not a logical outgrowth of the original
proposal. See First Am. Disc. Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 222
F.3d 1008, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Furthermore, agencies need not follow any
recommendations received through public comments. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n
of U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985).
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amount of time and resources, with a single rule often taking five to ten
years and tens of thousands of agency staff hours to promulgate.290 Time
and resource commitment associated with notice-and-comment leads to
such a burdensome process that, were revenue rulings subjected to noticeand-comment, the IRS routinely would delay or defer the issuance of these
rulings.291 This potential delay is common in other agencies.292 Noticeand-comment does not necessarily mean there will be any more public
participation in generating tax guidance than already exists293 because
notice-and-comment is used primarily as a recordkeeping process and
typically occurs when a rule is near its final form.294 As such, revenue
rulings as they currently exist are more ideal than other alternative sources
of law, such as Treasury regulations.
Shifting to a system that relies more heavily on revenue rulings than
costly and time-consuming regulations is justified by reducing the
agency’s burdens.295 Conversely, denying revenue rulings substantial
judicial deference will give taxpayers an indication they need not to abide
by rulings. When deference is denied to authoritative pronouncements,
costs and associated litigation rates likely will skyrocket, instances of
noncompliance will increase, and the IRS will have to divert resources to
enforcing the established law.296 Although costs of producing guidance
alone do not correlate directly to the level of deference accorded, a cursory
290. RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.6b,
at 336 (4th ed. 2004).
291. See Hickman, The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the Good Tax: Tax’s
Exceptional Regulatory Process, supra note 267, at 579.
292. See, e.g., MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32240, THE
FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/RL32240.pdf (providing that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration takes an average of ten years to develop and promulgate a health
or safety standard) [https://perma.cc/82FG-DJ2K]; Wendy Wagner et al.,
Rulemaking in the Shade, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 99, 143–45 (2011) (noting that it
takes the Environmental Protection Agency between five and six years to issue
roughly one hundred insignificant rules); EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v.
EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 24 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that the Environmental
Protection Agency has taken longer than 20 years to issue judicially adequate
rules regarding interstate transportation of pollution).
293. See Hickman, The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the Good Tax: Tax’s
Exceptional Regulatory Process, supra note 267, at 584.
294. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490
(1992).
295. See Hickman, The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the Good Tax: Tax’s
Exceptional Regulatory Process, supra note 267, at 594.
296. See id. at 593–94.
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glance over associated costs helps explain why revenue rulings require
judicial deference.297 Giving revenue rulings Chevron deference signals to
taxpayers that compliance is mandatory and will act as a gatekeeper to
would-be tax litigation, and “[t]he tax system cannot run without some
level of baseline deference to the tax administrator, which has no option
but to speak through something ‘less’ than regulations issued after notice
and hearing.”298 The policy issues associated with increased costs, in
addition to the legally-mandated requirements for deference being met,
requires Chevron deference for revenue rulings because anything less,
including Skidmore deference, is really no deference at all.299
D. Certainty, Reliance, and Consistency: Avoiding Incoherent
Representations
Taxpayer certainty and reliance require an efficient and effective
method of taxation, and “[r]obbing revenue rulings of any claim to actual
deference will diminish the IRS’s ability to inform taxpayers and IRS
personnel of the law and ultimately to set IRS policy and ensure voluntary
compliance with revenue laws.”300 Furthermore, general notions of equity
indicate that taxpayers expect the IRS to comply with its self-imposed duty
of consistency, which implicitly provides for taxpayer certainty.301
Congressional rules are more appropriate for providing certainty in areas
in which there is little change over time, which is not the case in either tax
law or in the charitable organization context.302 Though revenue rulings
necessarily are subject to less scrutiny than regulations and statutes, often
written in a conclusory style without a detailed explanation of factual
significance to the outcome, and lack clear reasoning as to why both the
facts and law support the finding,303 the rough justice they provide is
outweighed by many other redeeming qualities. For example, the
Commissioner of the IRS has the authority to retroactively revoke a

297. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1202 n.218 (2008).
298. Cummings, Jr., supra note 153, at 441.
299. See discussion supra Part I.B.
300. Morris, supra note 16, at 1004.
301. See generally Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin of Little Minds No More:
Justice Requires an IRS Duty of Consistency, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 317 (2006).
302. Hackney, supra note 185, at 115.
303. Lowy & Vasquez, Jr., supra note 13, at 235.
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revenue ruling that is contrary to law, in accordance with the congressional
intent evidenced in IRC § 7805(b).304
Like certainty and reliance, consistency is another fundamental
requirement for an effective tax administration to thrive. The IRS
continually has affirmed that treating similarly situated taxpayers equally
is an important goal of the tax system.305 Courts also recognize that
horizontal equity306 is an important goal of the tax system.307 Although
Congress has delegated to the Treasury Department—and implicitly to the
IRS—the authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations”308 for
enforcement of the IRC, this grant of authority rests in part on the need to
“ensure that in ‘this area of limitless factual variations,’ . . . like cases will
be treated alike.”309 Inconsistency contributes to taxpayer distrust in the
IRS, which may threaten the soundness of self-reporting—a practice the
IRS relies on heavily.310 A general and rigid policy of deference would
increase national uniformity regarding the meaning of tax laws by
decreasing the chance that courts across the nation adopt different views
when interpreting a particular provision of the IRC.311 Establishing a
policy of deference also would encourage the IRS to issue as much
guidance as possible.312
The need for a grant of Chevron deference to all IRS revenue rulings
that meet the requisite standard is especially pertinent in the context of
charitable organizations. Charitable organizations, like every other entity
regulated by law, need deliberate and principled analysis of the implicated
304. See generally Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm’r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); see
also Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
305. I.R.S. Mission, 2007-2 C.B. ii.
306. Horizontal equity is an economic theory that states individuals with
similar income and assets should pay the same amount in taxes, regardless of the
tax system in place. Ira K. Lindsay, Tax Fairness By Convention: A Defense of
Horizontal Equity, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 79, 79–81 (2016).
307. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948) (“[C]ollateral
estoppel must be used with its limitations carefully in mind so as to avoid
injustice.”); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (discussing how tax law
should usually “be interpreted so as to give a uniform application to a nationwide
scheme of taxation”).
308. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
309. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)
(quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).
310. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-567, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS SHOULD EVALUATE PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO
FOCUS ITS EFFORTS (2009).
311. Salem et al., supra note 1, at 722.
312. Id.
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values in tax law.313 Because the resolution of these vast issues has
significant financial implications, these organizations need a reliable set
of rules that create a clear and principled approach.314 These financial
implications also affect organizational behavior; thus, having clear,
concise, and reliable rules serves a broader social interest as well.315 For
example, though widely criticized, Revenue Ruling 69-545 still is cited
and employed316 for providing the standard by which hospitals rely on to
achieve charitable organization status.317 The question of realizing
democratic goals also is avoided because Congress affords charitable
organizations the right to challenge any IRS decision denying the
organization charitable status.318 A charitable organization also can
challenge IRS decisions in court by refusing to pay a tax—after which the
IRS will assess a deficiency against the organization—and then seeking a
refund from the IRS based on the organization’s tax-exempt status.319
Utilizing these various mechanism of review, “courts have played a role
in defining the contours of charitable organizations and healthcare.”320
CONCLUSION
Revenue rulings deserve substantial deference because they carry the
force of law and result from a formal administrative procedure. The IRS
issues revenue rulings under a general grant of authority by Congress,
which implicitly shows that Congress intends them to have the force of
law.321 The intent for revenue rulings to carry the force and effect of law
is evidenced further by the congressionally-mandated penalties that arise
when taxpayers do not comply with revenue rulings.322 Courts also should
afford revenue rulings Chevron deference, as such pronouncements are
responsive to complicated issues in a relatively quick manner, alleviating

313. Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules
to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 253 (1988).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Levin, 127 Ohio St. 3d 215, 221 (Ohio 2010).
317. Cecilia M. Jardon McGregor, The Community Benefit Standard For NonProfit Hospitals: Which Community, and For Whose Benefit?, 23 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 302, 315 (2007).
318. I.R.C. § 7428 (2012).
319. See id. § 7422.
320. Hackney, supra note 185, at 95.
321. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir.
1998).
322. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1), (c).
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the “cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive” problems associated
with notice-and-comment practices.323 Additionally, denying heightened
deference to revenue rulings runs afoul of the explicit reason the IRS
issues these pronouncements: to aid voluntary compliance with revenue
laws.324 If courts fail to defer substantially to revenue rulings, courts signal
to the public that reliance may not be justified; if courts do not
substantially defer to revenue rulings, such lack of deference indicates that
the IRS cannot necessarily be credited with correct interpretation of the
body of law over which this agency is required to exercise its enforcement
power and its right to provide guidance to the public. Furthermore, as seen
in the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 2007-41, revenue rulings are not
created arbitrarily but rather in response to public outcry and following
solicitation for public input.325
If the most appropriate method for promulgating governing rules is
not accorded adequate deference by the courts, the whole taxation
enterprise will collapse. Even though guidance in the form of revenue
rulings is much needed,326 the IRS would be stripped of any incentive to
take time and resources away from other pressing issues to focus on
promulgating documents that courts will toss to the side. Because they are
the ideal method for shaping tax law both in the charitable organization
context and tax law as a whole, revenue rulings that inherently carry the
force and effect of law are entitled to substantial—or Chevron—deference
by reviewing courts.
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323. See Cloverdale, supra note 59, at 86.
324. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (2005) (stating that the purpose behind
revenue rulings is to “assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary compliance”).
325. I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-17, supra note 227.
326. See discussion supra Part V.
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